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Abstract. The article reconstructs and compares two philosophical concepts of animal developed by René Descartes and 
George Berkeley. The analysis of the process of animal perception carried out by Descartes makes it possible to find an 
analogy between the two abovementioned concepts. According to the interpretation presented in the article, the Berkeleyan 
immaterialist metaphysics can be reconciled with attributing certain degree of rationality to brutes. However, the reconstruction 
reveals the complexity of Berkeley’s attitude towards Descartes and multidimensionality of his conception the epistemological 
parts of which can be reconciled with his metaphysics but can also be evaluated in separation from it. 
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Introduction 
The origins of the animal-machine concept 
attributed to René Descartes are sought in two 
dimensions. In the critical dimension it was associated 
with overcoming Aristotelianism with its teleological 
vision of nature and the tripartite division of the soul 
into vegetative, sensual and rational; in the positive 
dimension, the animal-machine concept is treated as 
the result of Cartesian metaphysical dualism. In fact, 
both elements are intertwined: the Cartesian 
philosophy of nature is a part of the seventeenth-
century efforts to present a new concept of nature, 
including various versions of materialism and 
corpuscularianism (Th. Hobbes, P. Gassendi, R. Boyle) 
or the descriptive program of the accumulation of 
natural history (F. Bacon, J. Locke), gradually found 
their culmination in Newtonian physics (Anstey, 2011: 
9). From R. Descartes' new, mechanistic understanding 
of nature, which is res extensa, a new concept of 
animal deprived of its soul emerged, whose life 
functions should be described as the result of the work 
of a mechanism (automaton) – the soul, and therefore 
consciousness, was reserved only for man. It seems, 
however, that such an interpretation of Cartesianism is 
inappropriate and leads to simplification. In fact, 
R. Descartes attributed the ability to perceive, albeit 
without conscious thinking to animals. This 
simplification can be explained by an excessive 
emphasis on the role of metaphysics in the cognition of 
nature; at the same time, it is worth adding that for 
R. Descartes, natural research, including physiological 
research, was an extensive and relatively independent 
subject of research.  
From this perspective, it is also interesting to what 
extent modern British philosophy, developing in the 
Cartesian paradigm, was aware of the shortcomings of 
such an interpretation. The metaphysical opposition 
between man and brute (reduced only to a mechanism 
within res extensa) was soon challenged both by John 
Locke (for whom the history of human reason extends 
from the simplest acts of perception, also characteristic 
of brutes) and David Hume (for whom neither rationality 
and nor passions, but morality and history only 
determined the uniqueness of man). The reconstruction 
of George Berkeley's position, in which, like in 
Descartes’, metaphysics is considered to be of great 
importance, is also particularly interesting. In this case 
we are dealing with a reshaping of the Cartesian 
stance which emphasizes the juxtaposition no longer of 
thinking and extension, but of active spiritual substance 
identified with the will and passive ideas whose 
existence is reduced to being perceived.  
The aim and tasks 
The aim of this article is to reconstruct the Cartesian 
position and compare it with the concept of animal 
present by G. Berkeley, on which Cartesianism had a 
significant, often ignored, effect (Szałek, 2016: 48 ff). In 
particular, we endeavor to demonstrate that the 
relationship between these two concepts only 
seemingly boils down to the rephrasing of the 
metaphysical position, as this would lead G. Berkeley 
to uphold the animal-machine concept, and only 
mechanicism would be understood in a different way. 
Although this may come as a surprise, the similarity 
concerns precisely the attribution of perceptual abilities 
to animals. This leads to several conclusions regarding 
a) the status of the animal given by R. Descartes and 
G. Berkeley, b) the philosophers' understanding of 
thinking, c) the relationship between metaphysics and 
natural sciences they recognize. This text consists of 
three parts. The first part juxtaposes the traditional 
metaphysical reading of the Cartesian concept with 
those interpretations in which animals are treated as 
sentient beings (though unconscious); the second part 
reconstructs Berkeley's position in which animals are 
endowed with the ability to perceive. Finally, in the third 
part we formulate conclusions on the mutual relation of 
both concepts and differences in the understanding of 
the role of cognition of nature and metaphysics.  
Research methods 
From the methodological point of view, the article is 
based on the analysis of source works and subject 
literature. In the case of Descartes, the analyses are 
based on works in the field of metaphysics and 
epistemology: Meditations on the First Philosophy, The 
Principles of Philosophy and A Discourse on the 
Method, and Passions of the Soul. Berkeley's position 
is reconstructed on the basis of Treatise of the 
Principles of Human Knowledge, An Essay Towards a 
New Theory of Vision, and Philosophical 
Commentaries – i.e. early works of the philosopher, 
including his notebooks which are important for tracing 
the formation process of his philosophy. The source 
analyses are complemented by a review of existing 
interpretations in the literature on the subject. 
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Research results. Slightly more than a machine – 
Descartes on animal. 
The contraposition of the extended and thinking 
substance, as well as the introduction of the category 
of mechanical causality into the description of nature 
was connected with the effort of overcoming the 
traditional image of nature which modern philosophy 
inherited from antiquity. First of all, it was found that the 
traditional Aristotelian view that nature is purposefully 
organized and that particular species are the purpose 
of development of their inner form can be known in 
advance as soon as their essential attributes are 
defined was no longer valid in modern times. Such a 
vision of the world was opposed both by new attempts 
to mathematize the nature (G. Galilei) and of previously 
unknown phenomena, which were reported from the 
journeys around the New World (the program of 
descriptive and historical knowledge by F. Bacon). 
Descartes's position eradicated the purposefulness of 
nature, leaving it only in the sphere of human thinking 
and conscious and deliberate management of will. The 
mechanistic description of phenomena fully presented by 
him in The Principles of Philosophy soon proved to be 
erroneous: R. Descartes' calculations of the amount of 
the whirling motion of three types of matter were quite 
quickly negated by Newton. However, the requirement of 
clarity and transparency of knowledge, certainty based 
on mathematical cognition, and thus the essential 
aspects of the Cartesian epistemological program, 
proved to be much more durable. Also the dualistic 
metaphysics with the juxtaposition of deliberate and 
spontaneous thinking and the extension subject to the 
laws of mechanics became a challenge for subsequent 
philosophers – even if the principles of this mechanics 
required corrections with respect to details. 
A particular challenge for philosophers and 
naturalists was the description of animals whose 
purpose of life Cartesianism reduced to mechanism. In 
his works, Descartes refers to the Aristotelian concept 
of three souls – vegetative, sensual and rational. The 
distinction between their kinds is invoked by the 
Aristotelians in order to emphasize the qualitative 
differences that are visible in the chain of existence, in 
the transition from inanimate matter through plant and 
animal to human life. Thanks to this distinction, it is 
possible to include the characteristics specific to 
human beings into it.  
R. Descartes certainly believes that typically human 
abilities in a particular way demand postulation of a 
separate soul, however the postulate of a hierarchy of 
souls, and more precisely the postulate of the sensual 
soul, in order to emphasize the animal's ability to feel, 
is a separate issue. First of all, it is unnecessary since, 
according to R. Descartes, the abilities of plants and 
animals can be explained by the properties of matter. 
Secondly, the postulate of the hierarchy of souls does 
not in principle explain anything but merely labels the 
stages in which further differences emerge, while giving 
the impression that the causes of these differences 
have been identified. Thirdly, the hierarchy of souls 
obscures the important distinction between the soul 
and the body, suggesting that the difference between 
them may only be a matter of degree. R. Descartes 
combines mechanistic interpretation with the principle 
of economics of thought and on this ground seeks to 
demonstrate that animals have neither a vegetative nor 
a sensual soul. Ockham's razor in this case means a 
law deductible from the simplicity of God's actions, 
according to which God did not multiply the “principles” 
beyond necessity. Therefore, in order to illustrate that 
the behaviour of animals should be explained by 
mechanical rules, he indicates that there is no need to 
seek any other “principle of movement and life” other 
than the simplest one that can be formulated in 
mathematical terms. Thus, Descartes's position should 
be considered on three levels: religious (indicating the 
distinctiveness of thinking, and consequently of the 
human soul, not subject to decomposition like the 
body), metaphysical (emphasizing the distinctiveness 
of two substances) and natural (presenting both: a 
physiological description of animal bodies, and 
behavioural, which shows the difference between the 
instinctive behaviour of animals and the rational 
behaviour of man). The religious dimension of the 
dispute over the nature of the animal is slightly less 
accentuated by R. Descartes, yet it must not be 
ignored. There were fears of mechanistic reductionism, 
of “reducing the spiritual to the physiological and the 
physiological to the physical” (Drozdowicz, 2014: 126), 
it was feared that Descartes' concept would lead to 
erroneous conclusions. The evidence for this is a letter 
to R. Descartes from Froidmont dated September 13, 
1637; we read there that replacing the sensual soul 
with purely mechanical processes introduces the risk 
that the human soul will also be reduced to them. The 
opponent addresses R. Descartes with the following 
words: “If one suppresses the vegatative and sensual 
soul in the brutes, one opens the door for the atheists, 
who will attribute the operations of the rational soul to a 
cause of the same kind and will give us a material soul 
to replace our spiritual soul” (Spink, 1974: 237). The 
author of the Meditations takes a position that is clearly 
opposed to such accusations. He points out that 
animals are treated by him on an equal footing with 
machines and refers to the Scripture in order to prove 
that there is no need for any kind of differentiation 
between the rational, sensual and vegetative soul. At 
the same time, he speaks against materialism, 
reiterating that res cogitans is also, besides res 
extensa, an elementary component of reality. 
However, metaphysical duality does not mean that 
we are dealing with blind mechanisms in the case of 
animals, because they are endowed with senses. 
R. Descartes attempts to determine which elements of 
the cognitive process should be attributed to the mind 
and which – to the body. Since in daily life cognition – 
including sense cognition – is somehow available in a 
final form, in which both these elements accompany 
each other, and only a philosophical analysis may point 
to their respective functions (Morris, 2000: 405). 
According to R. Descartes, sensations relating to 
functions previously assigned to sensual soul (e.g. 
feeling pain, seeing light, etc.) were unclearly 
intertwined with those dependent on the body (e.g. eye 
stimulation by light) and with the properties of the mind 
(e.g. thinking that my own eyes are being stimulated by 
light). The first two types of sensations belong also to 
animals, while the latter are specific only to people. In 
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The Passions of the Soul R. Descartes explains for 
instance that: “Our perceptions are also of two sorts, 
and the one have the soul as a cause and the other the 
body. Those which have the soul as a cause are the 
perceptions of our desires, and of all the imaginations 
or other thoughts which depend on them” (Descartes, 
1986: 79). Whereas in A Discourse on the Method he 
writes: For, in investigating the functions that could as a 
consequence be in this body, I found precisely all those 
which can be in us without our thinking of them, and to 
which our soul, that is to say, that part of us distinct 
from the body whose sole nature, as has been said 
above, is to think, contributes nothing; these functions 
are the same as those in which irrational animals may 
be said to resemble us. But I was unable to find in this 
body any of those functions which, being dependent on 
thought, are the only ones that belong to us as human 
beings. (Descartes, 2006: 39) 
Failure to observe this strategy of disambiguation is 
a source of an incorrect interpretation of the animal-
machine concept. Commentators of Descartes' 
thoughts note, for example, that he claims that animals 
do not have feelings or passions “like us” or “like ours”. 
They also recognize that R. Descartes did not deny 
that brutes have sensations as long as they depend 
solely on the structure and distribution of organs. 
However, it is routinely claimed that “the lack of 
feelings like ours” means the lack of feelings in general, 
and the statement that “they have sensations as long 
as they depend on the body” signifies a lack of 
sensations. Thus, in standard interpretations of the 
animal-machine concept, we are dealing with further 
mixing of what R. Descartes tried to separate (Morris, 
2000: 406). Using the example of visual cognition we 
may point to differences between a) a simple reaction 
to a visual stimulus, in which parts of an animal 
machine simply react in an appropriate way; b) visual 
consciousness, in which the perceiving subject 
possesses a mental representation of the object or 
state of things that previously provoked a reaction on 
the level of a visual stimulus; and c) the perception 
judgement, or the ability to reflect and make a 
judgement, for example, about the validity of the 
representation concerned. R. Descartes attributes the 
last ability only to human beings, stating that it requires 
the possession of a mind – the rational soul. The other 
two powers are also applicable to animals. Within 
Descartes' concept, the questions of how the organs of 
the senses work and why they work in this way are two 
separate issues (Gaukroger, 2000: 396). God, being 
the only ultimate cause, has given machines the 
organs of the senses, through which they are able to 
experience. However, if the body is not considered as 
an animal body or a human machine but as part of 
what Descartes calls the union of soul and body, the 
question of the purpose of sensual experience 
becomes legitimate – this however refers us to human 
thinking, as only within its scope can this question be 
legitimately posed. 
The Cartesian understanding of animals in 
Berkeley’s philosophy. 
In contrast to the conception developed by 
R. Descartes, G. Berkeley’s notion of an animal has 
been but rarely analysed by scholars (Charles, 2010: 
189 ff; Hight, 2011: 207 ff), which is hardly surprising 
since the Irish philosopher did not focus much of his 
attention on the subject. On the face of it, it seems that 
G. Berkeley follows the Cartesian path and opposes 
human freedom and conscience to animal mechanisms 
acting merely instinctively (even if the mechanism is 
conceived not as a modification of extended substance 
but rather as a set of ideas the esse of which is no 
more than percipi). For the scarcity of place we will not 
investigate into the differences between the two 
metaphysical presuppositions underlying both 
conceptions. The issue can be summarised as follows: 
for G. Berkeley all the content of human thinking (i.e. 
ideas) immediately depends on God’s activity as he 
writes in the Principles § 29 (Berkeley, 1749 (a): 53). 
However, it is noteworthy that Berkeley’s philosophy – 
and his conception of animals – was motivated by his 
religious beliefs. Berkeley, a member of Anglican 
clergy, makes a reservation that understanding and will 
are the qualities of spirits (or souls) of human beings: 
“A spirit is one simple, undivided, active being – writes 
G. Berkeley in § 27 of the Principles – as it perceives 
ideas, it is called the understanding, and as it produces 
or otherwise operates about them, it is called the will” 
(Berkeley, 1949 (a): 52). In opposition to the ideas of 
imagination which are “excited at random” ideas of 
sense “have… a steadiness, order, and coherence, 
are… excited… in a regular train or series, the 
admirable connection whereof sufficiently testifies the 
wisdom and benevolence of its Author” (Berkeley, 1949 
(a): 53). Thus, both factors shaping Berkeley’s thought: 
his metaphysical stance (immaterialism) and his 
religious commitment (the perspective of immortality of 
human souls) should make us think that brutes are 
mere soulless automats. 
However, though postulating the uniqueness of 
spirits and separating them from all natural 
phenomena, G. Berkeley attributes the ability to 
perceive to animals. The respective remarks can be 
found in his early Philosophical Commentaries as well 
as in his major works such as the Principles and the 
Three Dialogues: “For this end the visive sense seems 
to have been bestowed on animals, to wit, that by the 
perception of visible ideas (which themselves are not 
capable of affecting or any wise altering the frame of 
their bodies) they may be able to forsee (from the 
experience they have had of what tangible ideas are 
connected with such and such visible ideas) the 
damage or benefit which is like to ensue, upon the 
application of their own bodies to this or that body 
which is at a distance”. (Berkeley, 1948a: 193) 
The problem of the reconciliation of the spirits-ideas 
dualism and the proposition that animals can perceive 
drew the attention of researchers. According to 
Sebastien Charles the contradiction can be removed by 
observing that G. Berkeley adopts a non-Cartesian 
definition of soul the lower part of which can be 
attributed to brutes (Charles, 210: 197). Charles sticks 
to the traditional reading of the Cartesian conception of 
an animal as a mere mechanism and claims 
G. Berkeley abandons the Cartesian position in this 
aspect. However, it seems plausible that both stances 
can be reconciled and within the framework of 
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Berkeley’s theory the dualism of sprits and ideas can 
be maintained, and animals can be endowed with the 
ability to perceive. In order to do this one should refer 
to Berkeley’s psychological explanation of perceiving. 
The analysis of sense perception process carried 
out in An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision 
describes the shaping of the ideas of distance, 
greatness, and position of objects by the reference to 
the data of the senses of sight and touch. Visible 
extension is different from tangible and both senses 
must be correlated to form the idea of “objective” 
extension of objects. Speaking more generally: ideas of 
sight “suggest” ideas of touch (or, generally speaking, 
ideas caused by the awareness of our bodies) and 
within the process of “suggesting” the idea of objective 
extension can be formed in our imagination. The 
process of associating the ideas of both senses being 
habitual and unconscious needs a philosophical 
investigation pointing at the roles senses and 
imagination play in it (Berkeley, 1948 (b): 193). In an 
analogous manner sounds (e.g. words) can be 
associated with objects they signify. In both cases ideas 
of senses and ideas of imagination are combined which 
should be understood as a counterpart of two first stages 
of the process of perceiving specified by R. Descartes: a 
reaction to a sense stimulus and a mental representation 
of an object or of a state of things. G. Berkeley attributes 
this ability to brutes similarly to R. Descartes. A 
specifically human disposition is reflection (an 
awareness of one’s own mental states and the ability to 
distinguish them from an immediate sense experience) 
and volitional activity thanks to which one’s imagined 
and desired state of things can be an aim of one’s deeds 
and allow human beings to desire immortality which 
goes beyond any imagination. 
But the conception of animal perception can be 
reconciled with immaterialism and the view that all the 
souls we know are human. It is not a coincidence that 
G. Berkeley uses another term and speaks of animal 
“nature”, not of animal “soul” (Berkeley, 1955: 216). 
While considering animal behaviour the rationality can 
be attributed to brutes only by analogy with human 
beings. All the experience informing us of the animal 
behaviour or of their brain activity belongs to natural 
sciences and can be reduced to various ideas and their 
correspondence. Similarly, pain or pleasure can also 
be attributed to brutes but the ability of creating 
reflective, conscious preposition “I am suffering” 
cannot. Similarly, volitional activity is restricted only to 
spirits. Only finite human souls and the infinite spirit, 
God, can be really and efficiently active. Animal instinct 
can be understood as a purely natural phenomenon: 
we can speak of animal activity only in a vulgar sense 
as when we say of stone “hitting” the ground. For 
G. Berkeley the notion of spirit or soul has a religious 
meaning and spirituality is reserved only to the unique 
relation between God and man. 
Discussion 
According to the interpretation presented here, 
there is no necessity to presuppose that G. Berkeley 
endows brutes with souls in his early works, the 
Principles and in the Three Dialogues; also, the fact 
that the brutes do perceive is not tantamount with 
breaking with the immaterialist thesis and its distinction 
between active spiritual substances and passive ideas. 
On the psychological plane (referring to ideas and heir 
relations) Berkeley’s stance is similar to that of 
R. Descartes. His metaphysical principles, however, 
restrict the activity to spirits (human and divine). By 
distinguishing the real (i.e. metaphysical) and apparent 
(i.e. physical) causality G. Berkeley claims that the real 
cause of the instinctive behaviour of brutes is the 
Author of Nature even if in common sense of language 
one can speak of animals as agents. Though animals 
can perceive and experience pleasure and pain, which 
leads them to behave according to the needs of the 
self-preservation instinct, they are not real agents as 
they are not endowed with souls – even if from the 
human perspective the behaviour seems rational.  
Conclusions 
This, however, leads to several consequences. The 
first of them concerns human subjectivity. The thesis 
that only spirits are substances does not mean that the 
attributes such as understanding and will can be 
ascribed to it. Such a substance deprived of its 
attributes would be meaningless. In its principal 
meaning, the spiritual substance is nothing but the will, 
as can be read in the Philosophical Commentaries 828: 
“substance of a spirit is that it acts, causes, wills, 
operates, or if you please (to avoid the quibble that 
may be made on the word it), to act, cause, will, 
operate” (Berkeley, 1948 (a): 99; Daniel, 2018: 99). 
Substance is understood as activity and creativity, and 
in his understanding of the term G. Berkeley differs 
from R. Descartes who uses the categories of 
substance and attributes. Astonishing as it might seem, 
brutes can be but at the same time they are not 
substances for G. Berkeley. 
Secondly, the convergence of Descartes’ and 
Berkeley’s positions regarding the description of the 
multi-stage character of perception suggest a strong 
affinity of both conceptions. Though G. Berkeley 
opposed the Cartesian explanation of the process of 
perceiving extension the fundamental reason for his 
criticism was the geometrical, i.e. technical and 
derivative, character of the explanation provided by 
R. Descartes together with some difficulties in 
explaining particular phenomena. G. Berkeley 
supplemented it with a psychological analysis of the 
mental process, primary in relation to the geometrical 
one. Thus the relation between both thinkers does not 
boil down to a simple acceptance-refusal opposition; 
rather, it should be examined separately in particular 
fields of philosophical discourse: the metaphysical, the 
physical, and the psychological one. 
The last observation leads to the third 
ascertainment: as Bertil Belfrage once observed 
(Belfrage, 2006: 202 ff), within the framework of 
Berkeley’s philosophy the particular fields of discourse 
are relatively independent and can be treated 
separately. The explanation of phenomena as 
subjected to the laws of nature can be conceived 
without making references to metaphysical 
presuppositions. This feature of Berkeley’s thought 
seems to have its source in the influence of Newton. As 
it is well known, G. Berkeley followed the general 
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principles of Newtonian physics with its separation from 
metaphysical claims; the evidence of the fact can be 
found in his correspondence with Samuel Johnson 
where he finds the new physics “not in the least 
inconsistent with the principles he lays down” 
(Berkeley, 1949 (c): 279). Thus, the analysis of animal 
perception, though compatible with Berkeleyan 
metaphysics does not require the reference to it. 
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А. Гжеліньский, М. Лагош 
КОНЦЕПЦІЯ ТВАРИНИ-МАШИНИ У ДЕКАРТА І БЕРКЛІ. СПРОБА ПОРІВНЯННЯ 
Мета і завдання дослідження. Метою статті є реконструкція і порівняння двох філософських концепцій – Рене Декарта і 
Джорджа Берклі. Методологія дослідження. Стаття побудована на аналізі вибраних текстів згаданих філософів та філософської 
літератури з цієї теми. Обговорення. Наведена у статті інтерпретація протиставляється поширеному розумінню концепції 
тварини-машини і представляє поглиблений аналіз позиції Р. Декарта, згідно з якою сприйняття тільки в своїй останній фазі 
вимагає свідомості. Результати дослідження. Це дозволяє зберегти субстанціональну відмінність між твариною, що належить 
до res coginans, і мисленням. Визнання за тваринами обмеженої здатності сприйняття дозволяє Декарту відмовитись від 
припущення про існування субстанціональної тваринної души, що виступало би як непотрібне звертання до аристотелізму. 
Підкреслення складності процесу сприйняття дозволяє, незважаючи на різницю в підходах (дуалізм та імматеріалізм), побачити 
10 Вісник НАУ. Серія: Філософія. Культурологія. – 2019. – № 1 (29) 
аналогію між позиціями Р. Декарта і Д. Берклі. Це приводить до декількох висновків. Висновки. По-перше, дозволяє вказати на 
велику подібність, а, може бути, навіть зв’язок між концепціями французького та ірландського філософів. У випадку другого з 
них це припущення знаходить своє підтвердження у ранніх записках в Philosophical Commentaries. По-друге, Д. Берклі в своїй 
праці An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision, заперечуючи картезіанське геометричне пояснення сприйняття більшості 
предметів, в цілому все ж таки погоджується з картезіанськім психологічним поясненням, проте його доповнює і розширює. Це 
приводить до третього висновку, а власне, до підкреслення багатогранності творчості обох мислителів. Поза відмінностями 
метафізичних підходів треба звернути увагу на подібність психологічних та епістемологічних рішень. Особливо в випадку 
Д. Берклі маємо справу з уявною незалежністю фізіологічного, психологічного аналізу відносно метафізики. Проблема 
складності сприйняття і з’ясування можливості сприйняття у тварин в цілому узгоджується з імматеріалізмом, але може 
розглядатися і в відриві від нього. 
Ключові слова: Декарт, Берклі, тварина, сприйняття, імматеріалізм. 
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КОНЦЕПЦИЯ ЖИВОТНОЕ-МАШИНА У ДЕКАРТА И БЕРКЛИ. ПОПЫТКА СРАВНЕНИЯ 
Целью статьи является реконструкция и сравнение двух философских концепций - Рене Декарта и Джорджа Беркли. Статья 
построена на анализе выбранных текстов упомянутых философов и философской литературы по данной теме. Приведенная в 
статье интерпретация противопоставляется распространенному пониманию концепции животное-машина и представляет 
углубленный анализ позиции Р. Декарта, согласно которой восприятие только в своей последней фазе требует сознания. 
Данный концепт позволяет сохранить субстанциональное различие между животным, что относится к res coginans, и 
мышлением. Признание за животными ограниченной способности восприятия позволяет Декарту отказаться от предположения 
о существовании субстанциональной животной души, что выступало бы как ненужное обращение к аристотелизму. 
Акцентирование на сложности процесса восприятия позволяет, несмотря на разницу в подходах (дуализм и имматериализм), 
увидеть аналогию между позициями Р. Декарта и Д. Беркли. Это приводит к нескольким выводам: во-первых, позволяет 
указать на большое сходство, а может быть, даже связь между концепциями французского и ирландского философов. В случае 
второго из них это предположение находит свое подтверждение в ранних записках в Philosophical Commentaries. Во-вторых, Д. 
Беркли в своей работе An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision, отрицая картезианское геометрическое объяснение восприятия 
большинства предметов, в целом соглашается с картезианских психологическим объяснением, вместе с тем дополняя его и 
расширяя. Это приводит к третьему выводу, а собственно, к подчеркиванию многогранности творчества обоих мыслителей. 
Вне различий метафизических подходов необходимо обратить внимание на сходство психологических и эпистемологических 
решений. Особенно в случае с Д. Беркли, где мы имеем дело с мнимой независимостью физиологического, психологического 
анализа относительно метафизики. Проблема сложности восприятия и выяснения возможности восприятия у животных в 
целом согласуется с имматериализмом, но может рассматриваться и в отрыве от него. 
Ключевые слова: Декарт, Беркли, животное, восприятие, имматериализм. 
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Анотація. У межах статті систематизовано основний доробок теорії ігор у класичному її варіанті та визначено 
тенденції її розвитку в умовах сучасної «економіки уваги». Визначено, що бізнес, за формою та сутнісними ознаками 
являє собою стратегічну гру, яка містить у собі багатофакторні можливості щодо вибору й імплементації 
конкурентних або кооперативних стратегій. Закцентовано, що задіяні у сфері бізнесу стратегії є значущими для 
рівня розвитку економічної культури соціального середовища загалом та визначено перспективи подальшого 
використання інструментарію теорії ігор для аналізу інноваційних тенденцій Індустрії 4.0. Сформульовано ключові 
завдання, які стоять перед сучасним бізнесом як сферою ініціативної інноваційної діяльності, в умовах розгортання 
кризових процесів глобального масштабу. 
Ключові слова: філософія бізнесу, теорія ігор, стратегія, тактика, конкуренція, кооперація, еквілібріум Дж. Неша, 
економіка уваги, поведінкова економіка. 
Вступ 
Філософія бізнесу є відносно новим аналітичним 
виміром для сучасної України, хоча для 
американської та європейської спільноти вже 
встигла стати усталеним дослідницьким напрямом. 
Визначення філософських засад бізнесу 
орієнтоване, перш за все, на пошук продуктивних 
стратегій створення нових бізнесів та 
вдосконалення вже діючих. У такому вимірі важливо 
проводити демаркацію між бізнесом та 
підприємництвом як спорідненими, але все-таки 
дещо відмінними соціальними феноменами. Адже 
далеко не будь-яке підприємництво досягає рівня 
бізнесу, тоді як бізнес може являти собою цілий 
конгломерат різноманітних підприємств. 
Національні економічні системи розвинених 
країн розглядають бізнес-активність своїх громадян 
у якості їхнього невід’ємного права, яке не тільки 
закріплене законодавством, а й укорінене у системі 
суспільних відносин. Так, потреби малого та 
середнього бізнесу як такого, що репрезентує 
середній клас цих суспільств, вважаються 
ключовими задля забезпечення здорового 
економічного клімату. Адже саме засновники 
бізнесу створюють додаткові робочі місця та 
сприяють темпам зростання національних економік, 
а отже, й більш вигідному позиціонуванню країн в 
економічних рейтингах та індексах рівня життя. 
Тому, за таких обставин, бізнес постає як основа 
легітимації економічної системи загалом 
(Глушко, 2005). Економічна ж культура у сучасному 
